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ABSTRACT
Measures of risk of domino effect (contagion) transmitted through inter-
bank market are discussed and results on implementation of measurement
procedure in banking sector are presented. It is shown how a very limited
set of available data – interbank exposures and information from balance
sheets and profit a loss accounts – can help in generating randomised sce-
narios of possible losses related to market and credit risk.
1. Introduction. The definitions of contagion in financial system can be found in
Degryse and Nguyen (2004), Elsinger et al. (2003), Drehmann (2002), Wells (2004).
We concentrate on contagion resulting from interdependencies between banks through
interbank market exposures. The obligations that thus arise could transmit the conse-
quences of the insolvency or bankruptcy of a selected group of banks to other players
within banking sector. An undertaking with a placement that is not repaid (due to
debtor default) may not perform on its obligations to other banks. This situation is
termed the ”domino effect”, or ”contagion effect”. In the paper we are developing
methods of contagion measurement. For convenience, we define two sorts of defaults:
– primary defaults – as a result of market and credit risk factors external to
interbank market that can lead to bank’s losses, hereafter called primary losses ;
– secondary (contagious) defaults – resulting from structural dependencies be-
tween banks or financial institutions in general.
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In the article, we focus only on measuring secondary default’s size.
The literature elaborating on domino effect in financial system is huge. We refer to
the papers by Degryse and Nguyen (2004); Elsinger et al. (2003, 2004); Furfine (2003);
Huang and Wu (2001); van Lelyveld and Liedorp (2006); Naqvi (2004); Rochet and
Tirol (1996); Wells (2004). Works of Dow (2000); De Bandt and Hartmann (2000)
and Ha laj (2005) (in Polish) sum up the achievements in the field of systemic risk1
and contagion.
We will combine both Elsinger et al. (2003) and Degryse and Nguyen (2004) mak-
ing use of clearing payment concept but without complicated estimation of credit and
market risk in the system that is used by Elsinger et al. (2003) to build an econometric
model, generating shocks to the banking system based on macroeconomic variables
(so called MacroModel). So loss scenarios triggering defaults of banks are arbitrary
like in Degryse and Nguyen (2004). We will show however how the loss scenarios can
be randomised to reflect very basic suppositions about banking activity and environ-
ment like ”the amount of risk taken by a bank may be learnt from minimal capital
requirement (or CAR)” and ”correlation in portfolios may enhance domino effect”.
Regulatory capital requirements of banks serve as approximation of the credit and
market risk related to the observed asset structure of banks. We will focus on the
problem of aggregate measures of contagion effect.
The main questions we would answer in the article are as the following.
• Does the disability to repay interbank loans in one bank cause problems with
paying back liabilities in other banks? Such a transmission of problems through-
out the system is hereafter called contagion effect or domino effect.
• How can balance sheet and profit and loss account data be used to obtain more
accurate estimates of domino effect proneness? How correlation between assets
of banks can be embedded into the model?
• How to generate reasonable shocks effecting capital of banks that may trigger
or amplify contagion? Reasonable means reflecting risk taken by a bank.
• How can the contagion effect be measured for monitoring systemic risk?
2. Model. The model originates to Elsinger et al. (2003) and was simplified to be
applied without need to estimate the exact loss distribution credit and market risk
undertaken by the bank. The aim of the model is to find possible flows of payment
between banks resulting from interbank exposures given banks’ ability to pay back
loans, i.e. given what they receive from other bank, where their net exposure is positive
and given their current capital base and possible non-interbank market losses (or
1Risk affecting an entire financial system, and not just specific participants.
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profits). The flow of payments is measured by a vector of so-called clearing payments
obtained as a solution of the following equation:
p∗i = min

(
N∑
j=1
piijp
∗
j + (1 − γ)ei − Lossi
)+
, p¯i
 , (1)
where
• N — number of banks,
• p¯i — total obligations of bank i to other banks on deposits taken,
• p∗i — flow of funds from bank i to other banks in the system (an element of the
clearing payment vector),
• piij — ratio of deposits taken by bank i from bank j to total obligations of bank
i on interbank deposits,
• ei — capital base of bank i,
• γ — ”bankruptcy threshold”, i.e., percentage of capital base of bank i such that,
where its loss reduces equity to γei, bank i becomes bankrupt,
• Lossi — losses arising from market and credit risk incurred by bank i,
•  ∈ {0, 1} — indicates that the analysis considers market and credit risk losses.
More details on original specification of clearing payment equation can be found in
Elsinger et al. (2003) and on the particular form (1) in Ha laj (2005). We will elaborate
on ways of generating loss scenarios Loss in section 3 that is devoted to the range and
the availability of date used in the model. There is also a problem with ambiguity
of definition of bankruptcy threshold and we will comment on this matter in the
following subsection.
Bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is usually related to the level of bank’s capital. Such
a conclusion is supported by financial and economic theory that tries to answer the
question about conditions in which social costs of default are the lowest and share-
holder value is the highest. Even though in banking acts there are strict definitions of
situations when bank defaults, in many real life cases the boundary may be blurred.
It is clear that purely theoretically, capital of bank cannot be lower then 0. In fact the
main indicator of bankruptcy is capital adequacy ratio (CAR) falling below 8%. How-
ever, banking supervision may be concerned if CAR is falling dramatically or is only
slightly higher than 8%. It may require that banks undertake rehabilitation process
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and improve their capital base2. On the other hand, systemicly important bank may
be allowed to operate even if its CAR falls accidentally below 8% and there are reli-
able guarantees that it will succeed in rehabilitation process. Since the bankruptcy
level is not strict it seems reasonable to test domino effect under different definitions
of bankruptcy. We propose 3 definitions that will be used hereafter:
1. (”0%” case) if capital drops below 0 (γ = 0) – in this way we obtain the lowest
bound for estimation of domino effect spreading out through interbank channel;
2. (”50%” case) if capital drops below 50% of its current level (γ = 0.5) – such losses
could evoke actions by banking supervision since they may very significantly
aﬄict capital adequacy; it is assumed that bank can pay back liabilities till its
capital decreases by half. Than losses are fully transmitted to its interbank
creditors, i.e. there is no loss recovery;
3. (”8% CAR” case) if capital adequacy ratio falls below required 8% – bank
becomes insolvent in regulatory sense; analogously like in a case 2., bank repays
loans if only its CAR stays above 8%. This is equivalent to a case with γ = 0
and e := e− 8% · (risk weighted assets).
Example. Clearing payments method of contagion detection does not even require
arbitrary defaults. It indicates whether there is enough capacity for solvency in the
system, i.e. what happens if all interbank loans become due at the same time. Figure
(1) shows how clearing payments works.
3. Data.
1. Interbank market exposures – Polish central bank has complete set of bilateral
exposures of banks on the domestic market, so unlike in Austrian bank we do
not need to estimate it. Most of them are very short-term loans. However,
there is a small amount with residual time longer than 1 month. For each bank
we summed up exposures for all maturities and calculated netted interbank
exposure. For each pair of banks we got therefore a difference between deposits
taken by a given bank and obligations to its counterpart.
2. Capital base of banks (capital buffer) – the sum of equity capital, subordinated
debt, current period earnings and earnings pending confirmation.
3. Data for generating loss scenarios:
2Polish Banking Act states that Commission for Banking Supervision may require rehabilitation
process if bank reports a loss exceeding 50% of its capital. If rehabilitation fails within next 6 months
Commission may allow for takeover or liquidation.
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Figure 1: Contagious default in a system consisting of 3 banks
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Remark: Numbers in ellipsis indicate amounts of banks’ capitals and rectangles – amounts
of interbank liabilities. Clearing payments vector indicates that in case all liabilities in this
system are due, one of bank defaults since it has to repay 160 units and has only 140 units.
There is risk of contagion even in case of no trigger event unless the bank will supplement
its capital.
Source: own results
• In an ideal situation one could wish to have macroeconomic model (Macro-
Model) for forecasting or projecting financial results of banks. It should
link the macroeconomic variables and the assets/liabilities structure of par-
ticular bank with possible results of a bank and should provide an analyst
with distribution of results in the horizon of analysis.
• It may happen that lack of reliable data or insufficiently long time series
exclude construction of well-specified, statistically significant MacroModel.
But still it may be possible to estimate market and credit risk model for
forecasting loss distribution from market and loan portfolio.
• Even in a case, when the central bank does not have access to sufficiently
large database of loans, it may still be reasonable to consider some very
rough proxies for market and credit risk. Any relaxation of arbitrariness
in choosing the defaulting banks may help to understand the shape of
distribution of contagion losses. We propose to use regulatory minimum
capital requirements (MCR) that are reported to supervisory authorities.
It shows in a very approximate way how much risk has the bank taken.
The more risky assets it possesses the higher is MCR and the more volatile
financial results can be. At least one can expect that the distribution
function is more skewed to the right. There are at least 3 advantages of
such an approach. Firstly, MCR is the proxy for differences in probability
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of extreme loss events between banks. The study of extreme events is
important since they are usually the only trigger of contagion in this type
of models3. Secondly, the scenarios in the domino effect stress-test can be
parametrised by one parameter. The analyst has only to choose appropriate
class of distributions with one free parameter from which the losses can be
drawn independently. Thirdly, the analysis becomes very simple.
On the other hand, one has to keep in mind that loss distribution obtained
by means of MCR is the very preliminary approximation of bank’s losses.
Losses resulting from market and credit risk are far more complex function
of many economic factors and endogenous features of a bank. There is also
a serious problem of expiry mismatch between interbank loans and assets
that bear credit and market risk not related to interbank loans (household
loans, investment loans, commercial papers, treasury bills, listed stocks,
off-balance sheet items, etc.) that we use for justification of our loss sce-
narios. Losses from non-interbank exposures realise usually in far more
longer horizon then stable structure of interbank loans can be expected.
• The picture of losses in banking system is far from being complete unless
we add a measure of common / similar reactions of banks to economic
factors (EF) effecting banking environment and to performance of other
banks (P) like measures of reputation or herding behaviour. We elaborate
on this a little bit more.
(EC) Such factor like economic growth, inflation, interest rates, indebtedness
of the economy may change banks’ macroeconomic environment in a
similar way. For instance, if economic growth decelerates then firstly
banks grant less loan and capacity for generating profits declines and,
secondly slumping interest margins decrease rates of return from loan
portfolios in general. On the other hand, after soaring economic growth
eventually cools down, rate of irregular loans in all banks may increase
since banks may equally adopt less restrictive lending policies during
good times.
(P) Bank relies on reputation. If one bank fails to meet its liabilities it is
more likely that clients of other banks may require higher risk premi-
ums from other banks. Interbank market spreads may rise in general
or if failure was very surprising and severe it could trigger mass with-
drawal of deposits in the system. This type of contagion is very hard
to model since there is scarcity of data for estimation or calibration.
Hence, banks may react in a common way to some economic parameters.
MacroModel should capture correlation but what if no MacroModel is avail-
able? We propose three different solution based on commonly available
3Contagion through interbank market.
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data: time series of pretax profit, of irregular loans and of ratio of irregular
loans to total volume of loans.
So to generate losses we need a class of distributions parametrised by
(CAR) and with covariance matrix constructed from time series proposed
above. We than obtain multivariate distribution with marginal probabili-
ties from a given parametric class.
4. Loss scenarios. Ha laj (2005) propose a method for generating random scenar-
ios of losses based on the minimum capital requirements that is reported by banks.
We assumed firstly after Ha laj (2005) that the primary loss of a bank has exponential
distribution with parameter chosen in such a way that probability of loss exceeding
reported minimum capital requirement is equal to 99%. Minimum capital requirement
serves as a proxy for distribution of losses and we assume that capital covers 99% of
losses (as in Basel II regime). Thus distribution is controlled by means of only one
parameter. It makes the simulation very simple.
Then the following modifications were proposed4:
1. The primary loss is modelled indirectly. We assume that pretax profit has a nor-
mal distribution5 with mean in average historical pretax profit E [PretaxProfit]
and variance such that P(PretaxProfiti ≥ −MCR) = 1 − α, i.e. P(Lossi >
MCR) = α, MCRi is minimum capital requirements of bank i. A parameter
α is set to 0.01 or 0.05. So standard deviation of Lossi is set to σi satisfying
Φ
(
Lossi−PretaxProfiti
σi
)
= 1 − α, where Φ is cumulative standard normal distribu-
tion. It means that we assume that financial results of a bank have mean equal
to historical mean E [PretaxProfit] and losses does not exceed MCR in 99% of
cases. Results of calculation of loss distribution in the system are presented on
figures (10) and (8).
2. Correlation in financial results may enhance propagation of domino effect in
the system. Replacement of exponential distribution by normal distribution
can make modeling of the correlation simple. Namely, we take historical data
of pretax profits of banks and construct covariance matrix C of pretax profits.
Under assumption that profits are correlated like the empirical correlation shows,
we replace variance matrix σ
2
1 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 . . . σ2n

4Notation: ,,P” denotes theoretical probability and ,,E” — empirical expectation.
5Very simplifying assumption since usually losses related to credit risk are skewed and fatter-
tailed.
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by the following covariance one: σ
2
1 . . . [rijσiσj]j>i
...
. . .
...
[rjiσjσi]i>j . . . σ
2
n
 ,
where rij is correlation between pretax profit of bank i and bank j. Comparison
of results with and without correlation for Polish banking system are presented
on Figures (10), (11), (8) and (9). This is a very simplified approach. Firstly,
one should look for correlation directly in asset classes of banks and infer from
this correlation in profits, to capture dependence of risks imbedded into assets
and minimise seeming, statistical correlation. Secondly, this approach is very
backward-looking and does not take into account possible economic scenarios
that would influence banking sector in the nearest periods. Apart from pretax
profits correlation between losses can be inferred from the proxy for credit risk
which is the most important source of risk in banking. We propose to use
correlation between irregular loans of banks and relation of irregular loans to
total loans.
5. Measures of contagion. We measure contagion based on series of clearing
payments calculated for different scenarios drawn from a given primary loss distri-
bution. For broad characteristics of contagion we use a couple of measures of loss
distribution:
1. number of contagiously defaulting banks — measure of how broadly the conta-
gion spread across the system;
2. total loss — total amount of interbank loans that are not paid back by conta-
giously defaulting banks; they may lead to further defaults or not but would
influence profit/loss account of other banks in the system;
3. share of defaulting banks in total assets — the share of assets of banks that
defaulted in total assets of banking sector; informs whether small or large banks
are prone to domino effect;
4. average CAR – mean capital adequacy ratio of all banks except primarily de-
faulted banks; tells how much contagion effect aﬄicts capital adequacy of bank-
ing system;
5. measures on distribution of losses that are obtained from simulation i.e.:
• value-at-risk of domino effect losses — 95th or 99th percentile of total loss
or share of defaulting banks in total assets or 1st or 5th percentile of average
CAR;
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• expected shortfall during contagion — expected total loss given the fact
that contagion occurred i.e., the coincidence of interbank structure and
losses resulting from credit or market risk led to at least one secondary
default.
6. Simulations. We generated scenario of losses from given primary loss distribu-
tion for each bank taken into account in the simulation. Then we calculated clearing
payments for the system. We repeated this step 5000 times for each distribution, i.e.
we performed a kind of Monte Carlo simulation. In most cases there was no loss and
the tail of distribution would not be seen. That is why we showed conditional distri-
bution of losses, i.e. we calculated distribution of losses given secondary bankruptcy
took place and presented it on figures. Fields of bars on a given figure sum up to 1 so
each bar refers to probability of the loss for which the bar is plotted. So the higher
and the more dense the bars are the more likely it is that losses referring to these bars
occur. We are gathering general observations.
Netting. We used netted exposures in our simulation. This is justified by the fact
that in case a given bank refuses to meet its obligations to other bank, its creditor
can block all deposits taken from this given bank. After having looked into data we
observed only a few pairs of banks with such bilateral exposures, which is not surpris-
ing. However we observed some and we checked how netting assumption changes the
contagion results. We used exponential loss distribution with MCR as a bound for its
99 percentile. As figures (2) and (3) show, the difference between domino effect mea-
sured by distribution of contagious losses is negligible and can rather be an outcome
of Monte Carlo approximation.
Bankruptcy level. The results of contagion in a ”50%” case look significantly
different than in case default happens below 0. It is not surprising but confirms that
analysis should be done for different levels of capital to avoid over and underestima-
tion of contagion risk. In a ”50%” case expected shortfall measured by amount of
losses was almost 1.7 time higher than in ”0%” case. Figures (6) and (7) indicate
that ”50%” and ”8% CAR” cases are not substitutes. Contagious losses generated in
the case when bankruptcy occurs after CAR drops below 8% are much higher than in
remaining 2 cases.
Correlation. Correlation was calculated based on quarterly data starting from
Q1 of 1998. We make here a technical note. The correlation was calculated only for
those banks that operated for at least 10 periods (10 quarters). Since some banks
started to operate quite recently or were active only at the very beginning of period
of analysis (and for example were taken over) we excluded very short time series and
avoided seeming correlation. It can be seen that by taking into account correlation
the number of default events decreases but mean loss increases. What is more cor-
relation makes the tail of distribution of contagious losses thicker (see figure (9)). It
means that huge losses are more likely — probably results of banks that are subject to
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Figure 2: Distribution of unpaid liabilities
of banks suffering contagious failure given
default and with probability that the loss
exceeds MCR equal to 95% (exponential
distribution), without netting, 31 Dec
2005 (in mln z l)
0 200 400 600 800 1000 12000
0.005
0.01
0.015
contagious loss
Note: default occurred in 349 cases of total
5000 scenarios. Expected shortfall in the sys-
tem is equal to 111.2 mln z l.
Source: NBP.
Figure 3: Distribution of unpaid liabilities
of banks suffering contagious failure given
default and with probability that the loss
exceeds MCR equal to 95% (exponential
distribution), with netting, 31 Dec 2005,
(in mln z l)
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0.002
0.004
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0.014
contagious loss
Note: default occurred in 367 cases of total
5000 scenarios. Expected shortfall in the sys-
tem is equal to 100.3 mln z l.
Source: NBP.
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Figure 4: Distribution of unpaid liabilities
of banks suffering contagious failure given
default and with probability that the loss
exceeds MCR equal to 99% (exponential
distribution), default if capital drops below
50% of initial capital, 31 Dec 2005 (in mln
z l)
0 500 1000 1500 2000 25000
0.002
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0.01
contagious loss
Note: default occurred in 3367 cases of total
5000 scenarios. Expected shortfall in the sys-
tem is equal to 187.15 mln z l.
Source: NBP.
Figure 5: Distribution of ratio of assets
of banks suffering contagious failure to to-
tal banking sector assets given default and
with probability that the loss exceeds MCR
equal to 99% (exponential distribution),
default if capital drops below 50% of ini-
tial capital, 31 Dec 2005, (in mln z l)
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.350
10
20
30
40
50
contagious loss
Note: Expected shortfall in the system is
equal to 3.53% of total assets.
Source: NBP.
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Figure 6: Distribution of unpaid liabilities
of banks suffering contagious failure given
default and with probability that the loss
exceeds MCR equal to 99% (exponential
distribution), default if CAR drops
below 8%, 31 Dec 2005 (in mln z l)
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 30000
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5 x 10
−3
contagious loss
Note: default occurred in 4893 cases of total
5000 scenarios. Expected shortfall in the sys-
tem is equal to 358.91 mln z l.
Source: NBP.
Figure 7: Distribution of ratio of assets
of banks suffering contagious failure to to-
tal banking sector assets given default and
with probability that the loss exceeds MCR
equal to 99% (exponential distribution),
default if CAR drops below 8%, 31 Dec
2005, (in mln z l)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.40
5
10
15
20
contagious loss
Note: Expected shortfall in the system is
equal to 6.33% of total assets.
Source: NBP.
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Figure 8: Distribution of ratio of assets
of banks suffering contagious failure to to-
tal banking sector assets given default and
with probability that the loss exceeds MCR
equal to 95% (normal distribution), 31
Dec 2005
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contagious loss
Note: default occurred in 1235 cases of total
5000 scenarios. Expected shortfall (expected
loss given default) in the system is equal to
129.9 mln z l. VaR.05 = 245.2 mln z l.
Source: NBP.
Figure 9: Distribution of ratio of assets
of banks suffering contagious failure to to-
tal banking sector assets given default and
with probability that the loss exceeds MCR
equal to 95% (normal distribution) and
bank returns are correlated, 31 Dec 2005
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contagious loss
Note: default occurred in 953 cases of total
5000 scenarios. Expected shortfall in the sys-
tem is equal to 161.8 mln z l. VaR.05 = 251.3
mln z l.
Source: NBP.
domino effect are negatively correlated with their debtors and contagion is amplified.
However, it is seen only when comparing expected shortfalls that differ significantly.
VaR does not indicate any difference. It illustrates usual problem with VaR that does
not show how large the losses would be in extreme cases. It gives only lower bound
for them.
Capital adequacy ratio. As a point of reference for current capital adequacy
in the system we calculated average CAR before simulation for those banks whose
CARs stayed in between 8% and 50%. We did not include all banks since there are
banks with extremely high CAR (e.g. start-ups) or banks that terminated activity but
still report their financial data to supervisory authorities and have CARs significantly
lower then 8%. These outliers would spoil the capital adequacy. Average CAR for
eligible banks amounted to 14.88% which is quite high. Since we wanted to measure
pure impact of contagion on solvency in the banking system, we calculated average
CAR after each scenario of primary losses in a special way. We subtracted contagious
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Figure 10: Distribution of ratio of assets
of banks suffering contagious failure to
total banking sector assets given default
and with probability that the loss exceeds
MCR equal to 99% (normal distribution),
31 Dec 2005
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.080
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contagious loss
Note: default occurred in 211 cases of total
5000 scenarios. Expected shortfall in the sys-
tem is equal to 76.6 mln z l. VaR.01 = 100.1
mln z l.
Source: NBP.
Figure 11: Distribution of ratio of assets
of banks suffering contagious failure to to-
tal banking sector assets given default and
with probability that the loss exceeds MCR
equal to 99% (normal distribution) and
the bank return are correlated, 31 Dec
2005
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contagious loss
Note: default occurred in 171 cases of total
5000 scenarios. Expected shortfall in the sys-
tem is equal to 90.4 mln z l. VaR.01 = 102.1
mln z l.
Source: NBP.
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Figure 12: Distribution of ratio of assets
of banks suffering contagious failure to
total banking sector assets given default
and with probability that the loss exceeds
MCR equal to 99% (normal distribution),
correlation by irregular loans 31 Dec
2005
0 0.05 0.1 0.150
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80
100
contagious loss
Note: default occurred in 140 cases of total
5000 scenarios. Expected shortfall in the sys-
tem is equal to 144.5 mln z l. VaR.01 = 105.5
mln z l.
Source: NBP.
Figure 13: Distribution of ratio of assets
of banks suffering contagious failure to to-
tal banking sector assets given default and
with probability that the loss exceeds MCR
equal to 99% (normal distribution) and
the bank return are correlation by ra-
tion of irregular and total loans, 31
Dec 2005
0 0.05 0.1 0.150
50
100
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200
contagious 
Note: default occurred in 141 cases of total
5000 scenarios. Expected shortfall in the sys-
tem is equal to 112.4 mln z l. VaR.01 = 87.1
mln z l.
Source: NBP.
losses from capital of banks that were creditors of secondly defaulted banks and kept
capital of primarily defaulted banks unchanged. Then we recalculated CARs for
every bank that was eligible before simulation. Figures (14) and (15) show significant
differences in tails of average CAR for ”0%” and ”8% CAR” cases after calculation
of domino effect with correlation inferred from ratio of irregular and total loans. In a
”8% CAR” case capital adequacy of banks is obviously effected stronger but even in
the worst cases the system remains solvent.
The analysis is very sensitive to the level of probability set for extreme events.
Figures (8) and (9) show significantly higher possible domino effect losses in a case
where probability of primary loss exceeding MCR is 5% than in case of 1% probability
(see figures (10) and (11)).
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Figure 14: Distribution of average CAR
given default and with probability that the
loss exceeds MCR equal to 99% (normal
distribution), correlation by ratio of
irregular and total loans 31 Dec 2005
13.5 14 14.5 150
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CAR
Note: VaR.01 = 13.59, VaR.05 = 13.88,
VaR.1 = 13.97
Source: NBP.
Figure 15: Distribution of average CAR
given default and with probability that the
loss exceeds MCR equal to 99% (normal
distribution), the bank return are corre-
lated like ratios of irregular and total
loans and bankruptcy takes place if CAR
of a bank drops below 8%1, 31 Dec 2005
10 11 12 13 14 150
1
2
3
4
5
6
CAR
1 It is assumed that bank pays from its capital
till its CAR stays above 8%; if it surpasses the
threshold it defaults and recovery rate is set
to 0.
Note: VaR.01 = 10.28, VaR.05 = 10.49,
VaR.1 = 10.66
Source: NBP.
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7. Conclusion.
The general conclusion is that domino effect analysis can be done with simple loss
scenario generators like one- or two-parameter distributions if there is not available
any complex MacroModel for projecting or predicting results and losses. Parameters
can be calibrated based on pretax profits, minimal capital requirements and irregular
loans. It is reasonable to test domino effect for different bankruptcy levels and assess it
with different measures. It will lower the risk of under- or overestimation of contagion
effect.
However, results of models of this kind, used for estimation of the size of solvency
contagion have to be treated with caution. Firstly, there is evident maturity mismatch
between interbank exposures and these asset item like housing loans or securities that
are basis for loss scenarios related to market and credit risk. It forces us to make a
strong assumption about stable structure of interbank exposures. If there were rumors
that the bank may face severe losses the interbank market would probably react very
fast. Secondly, the method can easily lead to under- or overestimation of contagion
risk. Usually events triggering contagion are extreme but there is not enough data for
estimation of tails of credit and market loss distribution. On the other hand, clearing
payments may be a very powerful tool for detection of liquidity contagion risk, since
only very short-term exposures would be modeled and no maturity mismatch would
take place.
It is difficult to compare the usefulness of different ways of loss scenario generating
and different contagion measures that where presented. Domino effect should rather
be tested by means of as many of them as possible. It is an analyst choice which
triggers of loss events she wants to emphasise and what kind of domino effect outcomes
she wants to measure. It may be interesting to ask about the size of domino effect in
absolute terms or in relation to banking sector assets for intertemporal comparisons.
The central bank and supervisory authority may want to know whether domino effect
can essentially harm capital adequacy of banks or – from other point of view – how
strong the shocks should be to pull banks’ capital adequacy ratios below required 8%
solvency threshold. It would be a kind of robustness analysis.
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